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BOOK REVIEWS
DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY. By Kenneth Culp
Davis. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. 1969. Pp. xii,
233. $8.50.
Kenneth Culp Davis ranks among the most eminent and most
seminal legal thinkers of our times. Moreover, he writes clearly,
forthrightly, and succinctly. One of his books, whatever the subject, is
entitled to careful, thoughtful reading and to serious consideration. The
volume under review certainly merits such treatment.
Basically, the reader should keep in mind the limits within which
Professor Davis undertook to write. His subtitle is "A Preliminary
Inquiry." Clearly, this book is not intended to be a definitive work,
although one result of the author's positive style is to produce the
impression that he is dogmatic and that his dogmas are not wholly
consistent. I do not believe that he means to be dogmatic. I think he
intends to lay before us certain problems for our consideration.
Professor Davis does not propose to give us the" answers, although
occasionally he creates the impression that such is his purpose. If, then,
we keep in mind the warning that this book is preliminary and that it
is an inquiry, we shall avoid being either disappointed or shocked at
some of the statements we encounter.
Also, we need to be mindful of what Professor Davis means by
justice and what he means by discretion. He tells us that one
"dominant function" of the administrative agencies is "the
administration of justice for individual parties; that is, working out fair
disposition of problems that affect particular parties" (p. 7). On the
preceding page, he has distinguished "social justice," which relates to
policy, and has laid stress on justice as dealing with "determinations
of rights of individual parties." I think, therefore, that we must take
Professor Davis as saying that, for the purposes of his inquiry, he
conceives justice as simply meaning. the "fair disposition" of the
interests or claims of individuals as they come before officers of the
government. I say "officers of the government" because, while in the
immediate context of the quotations just made, he has stressed the
"administrative process" and "administrators," it becomes apparent
very shortly that he is concerned with courts as well and sometimes
with legislators.
As to discretion, he starts out by saying that an "officer has
discretion whenever the effective limits upon his power leave him free
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to make a choice among possible courses of action or inaction" (p. 4).
He points out that under this definition some discretion-a "good
deal," he says-may be illegal. However, this raises an interesting
question when we come to speak of "discretionary justice." If justice
is a "fair disposition" of problems 'affecting parties, can there be an
illegal discretion in the administration of justice? Can an illegal exercise
of choice bring about justice? Must we not confine our definition of
discretion in conjunction with justice to those situations where the law
allows an officer to make a choice without providing a standard
against which his choice is to be measured and a process by which that
measure may be put into operation? I ask this because, in many places
throughout the book, Professor Davis's plaint seems to be not that
functionaries are permitted by the law to make choices, but that they
"get by" with choices that the law really does not give them. This may
result from apathy, official or social, or from a lack of appropriate
tools for enforcing the commands of the law against the officiary. I do
not think that these are proper instances of discretionary justice. They
may result, however, in the accomplishment of justice, if that is defined
as a "fair disposition" of the problems between the parties, as in
Professor Davis's example of the policeman who decides to warn or to
advise rather than to arrest because this seems the best way to deal with
a boy just on the verge of criminality. Professor Davis seems to suggest
that this is unjust, because another boy, for one reason or another, may
not get the same chance. However, I would be more inclined to use the
jurisprudential term "justice without law," to describe the situation
rather than to refer to it as an example of discretionary justice or
injustice. We shall then be faced with deciding the problem of whether
or not, in certain situations, it may be better policy to permit justice
without law, taking all the chances of abuse that may be involved, than
to insist upon a rigid scale of justice according to law with the element
of effective legal choice made practically nonexistent.
Professor Davis's view seems to be that we should reduce to a
minimum the opportunity for official freedom in dealing with
individual interests. With the reservation implicit in the immediately
preceding discussion, I agree with him. The elements of doubt relate
chiefly to specifics.
While Professor Davis urges that the area of discretion should be
cut down-by legislative standards and by administrative rules
alike-he places primary faith in the administrative rule-making
process for accomplishing the desired reduction of discretion. As all
who have followed his writing through the years know, he has little
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regard for the effectiveness of the constitutional reading that legislative
power may not be delegated, save by the provision of some meaningful
(the adjective is his) standard by which administrators may be guided
to effectuate the legislative purpose and may be checked by the
judiciary if they go too far afield. Of course, no one today would couch
a lance in defense of the outmoded doctrine that legislative discretion
may not be delegated at all. Yet Professor Davis writes as though the
insistence upon standards as a basis for valid delegation were this old
doctrine in a new guise. I shall not repeat here what I have said
elsewhere' concerning the effectiveness of the requirement of standards,
properly understood. What troubles me here is the faith which
Professor Davis places in the substitute he proposes. He would impose
a judge-made requirement that agencies, even if the legislators have
provided them with no semblance of a standard, shall proceed to
eliminate discretion by setting up elaborate rules for dealing with
whatever problems the lawmakers have dumped in their laps. He seems
to say that, necessarily, the legislators cannot formulate standards to
guide the agencies in setting up these rules. Obviously, in his opinion,
the judges cannot effectively police such standards if the legislators set
them up. Yet he feels that the judges, with no standards by which to
measure the sufficiency of the rules, can require the agencies to provide
the necessary safeguards against overly broad discretion. But how,
without some legislative guideposts, can the judges determine what is
overly broad? Certainly, it is not enough to say "Let there be rules."
How detailed must these rules be? To what ends must they be directed?
Either the judges will be free-wheeling in determining within what
bounds the agencies must stay and what shall be the essential form of
the statutory scheme or they must be satisfied with whatever body of
rules the agencies bring up. I certainly would consider the first
alternative judicial usurpation of legislative prerogatives in policy
determination. The second simply gives us, with a vengeance, the
permissibility of complete legislative abdication to the agencies, a
prospect that many of us find appalling
The truth is that legislators can do a reasonably effective job of
spelling out reasonably adequate pictures of what they want. If they
1. See Merrill, Standards-A Safeguard For The Exercise Of Delegated Power, 47 NEB.
L. REv. 469 (1968); Merrill, The Local Administrative Agencies, 22 VAND. L. REv. 775, 780-89
(1969).
2. Fuchs, The New Administrative State: Judicial Sanction for Agency Self-Determination
in the Regulation of Industry, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 216 (1969), points out the dangers inherent in
such permissiveness.
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know that their enactments will be held invalid if they do not provide
decent standards, this is a valuable incentive to induce them really to
get down and think about the problem. I can testify from personal
experience in working with legislators that this is true. Insistence upon
the provision of standards is one way to improve the legislative
product, and the facilities available for legislative aid today make it
quite reasonable that we should increase this incentive. We can get
some pretty wild-ranging expansion of regulation to matters undreamt
of by lawmakers or their constituents3 if we do not maintain the
necessity for an adequate expression of legislative aims and some
appropriate device for putting these aims into effect.
It does not seem an adequate answer to say (p. 49) that sharp
divisions about policy in respect to new problems or actual ignorance
as to what the best policy may be at times make legislative clarification
of objectives undesirable. If the situation is all that fluid, it calls for
study, not enactment. A full scale, legislatively authorized, completely
empowered investigatory process should be set in motion, out of which
could come lawmaking that could embody properly drawn standards.
The requirement of standards does not demand a full code, of course.
Everyone recognizes this. But we surely do not want to turn over to
non-elective hierarchies (or elective, for that matter, if the base is not
adequate) the establishment of basic policy. Our experience with some
zoning authorities is enough to establish the undesirability of presenting
such a carte blanche.
There is another objection to requiring so heavy an emphasis on
rule making as Professor Davis suggests. The more we reduce matters
to rule, the more we facilitate the work of those who chart courses
designed to evade policy as much as possible. In this respect, I may
be less strict than Professor Davis thinks I should be. I do not believe
it is possible successfully to police a society of modern complexity on
the Benthamite principle that there should be, for every fact situation,
a rule so clear and specific that the most unsophisticated layman knows
exactly what to do. We must rely on some rather elastic general
standards that can be fitted to many and varied situations. The
necessary tailoring must be adjusted to the occasion. This is what
judges and administrators are for. My concern simply is that neither
be turned too far loose. Professor Davis agrees (pp. 49-51) that some
delegations are too sketchily drawn. He would prefer to see the courts
3. Packer Collegiate Institute v. University of State of New York, 298 N.Y. 184, 81 N.E.2d
80 (1948), is an example of an administrative agency acting under such a roving commission,
checked by resort to the doctrine of standards.
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deal with these by determining whether a particular delegation of
discretion is necessary or unnecessary. My own view is that the doctrine
of the constitutional necessity of standards for the exercise of
discretionary authority is preferable. Perhaps the differences between
our positions are more verbal than substantial. However, it does seem
to me that his are the more likely to condone sloppy legislative
draftsmanship and judicial and administrative free-wheeling.
Professor Davis presents an interesting and stimulating discussion
on selective law enforcement. He thinks that there is too much of this,
and urges that this is a place where, as to the policeman, the
prosecuting attorney, and the regulatory agency, there should be much
more standardization. To the extent that this is a call for the
elimination of favoritism or of discrimination based on the segment of
society the suspect comes from, it is legitimate. Much can be
accomplished to eliminate this by what Professor Davis terms
"structuring" and through training programs oriented toward the
standardization of procedures. I believe that we need to think rather
carefully about the adaptability of the ombudsman procedure (p. 150)
to American conditions. We might let ourselves in for a substantial
addition to our public expenditures, coupled with a lot of acrimonious
public name calling, without really accomplishing anything. Certainly,
I would not advocate that legislators take over this task (p. 148).
Judicial review over the problem of selective enforcement is a
matter which I think the courts have been wise in shunning It is
doubtful whether statutory provision could be adequately drawn or
effectively implemented. The Michigan statute prescribing judicial
supervision of a decision not to prosecute, cited by Professor Davis (p.
212), seems more an instance of law in books than of law in action
Moreover, we. have seen in our own time a demand for the
individualization of justice, and I do not believe we can have a very
efficient individualization if we rule out effective discretion by
prosecutors. To state just one example, there often are cases in which
there is adequate evidence to sustain a guilty verdict if the matter were
submitted to a jury, yet, viewing all the evidence, the prosecutor
4. It is submitted that Moog Indus., Inc. v. FTC, 355 U.S. 411 (1958), and FTC v.
Universal-Rundle Corp., 387 U.S. 244 (1967), do not bear the implications that Professor Davis
reads into their dicta. The general policy against judicial interference with decisions to prosecute
or not is too well established to require citation.
5. Two cases have been found which mention the statute. In neither was judicial reversal
of the prosecutor's decision involved. See In re Elliott, 315 Mich. 662, 675, 24 N.W.2d 528, 533
(1946); Spalding v. Low, 56 Mich. 366, 23 N.W. 46 (1885). Quite evidently, in practice, the judges
are not revising the prosecuting attorneys' determinations to let sleeping dogs lie.
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properly may conclude that it would be unjust to subject the defendant
to the harassment of a public trial and to the uncertainties of a jury's
ability properly to evaluate the evidence. Can a decision not to
prosecute in such an instance be made effectively if there must be a
statement of reasons as a matter of public record? Do we really want
to eliminate discretion of this kind?
A great many other comments could be made upon the many
pertinent and searching questions raised in this book. It is a
preliminary investigation into a subject of the greatest importance. We
must all accept responsibility for seeing that the inquiry is continued
to the end that undesirable discretion is eliminated without undue
hampering of that discretion which is desirable.
MAURICE H. MERRILL*
* Professor of Law, Oklahoma University College of Law.
GAMBLING AND ORGANIZED CRIME. By Rufus King. Washington:
Public Affairs Press, 1969. Pp. viii, 239. $6.00.
The continuing scandals of syndicated crime and the gambling arts
is the subject of this penetrating book by Rufus King, Gambling and
Organized Crime. Its nine chapters and eight appendices paint a sordid
picture of America's $20 billion favorite sport-gambling. Based on
"round figure estimates and inference drawing," it expounds the
doctrine that while "gambling activity itself cannot be altogether
condemned as a social evil," when organized on a large scale "it
becomes viciously corrupting." Rather than* proposing ."total
prohibition," it concludes that law enforcement must concentrate its
efforts on professional gambling promoters but that in this endeavor
little reliance can be placed on local ordinances, officials, or
governments, which "are too easily corruptible." The "firing-line
burden," King says, must be largely borne by the state but its anti-
gambling laws must be overhauled, penalty structure made more
effective, and lines of authority clarified and strengthened. To the
federal government he allocates "the suppression of big-time gambling
operations." He would not legalize professional gambling in any form
or at any level. However, he gives charity-sponsored gambling the nod
so long as "it fits reasonably into all the categories-private, casual,
social, and occasional." In addition, he concludes that pari-mutuel
track operations are "so powerful it is simply not realistic to talk
about eliminating" them-a frustrating conclusion which I do not
share. But, King opines, they should be discouraged from expanding;
and their by-product, off-track betting, should not be legalized or state-
conducted. Finally, Nevada's example for state-controlled gambling is
bad, and state lottery proposals-based upon the experience of New
Hampshire and New York-are dangerous and not an effective revenue
raiser.
The top tool, the author says, in the war on the gambling
promoter would be legalized wiretapping, even if the fourth amendment
must be trimmed to attain it. And its No. 2 helper would be the
revitalization of federal taxes on gambling, while a general immunity-
for-witness statute would round out the trimvirate of "musts." I have
doubts on all of these which will be discussed later.
As an embellishment to this package, Mr. King has a theme song
which is the handicapper of his program. It is that criminal hook-ups
headed by underworld characters, ranging from Tony Accardo to Joe
Zicarelli, "run illegal gambling with the full knowledge and sometime
active participation of local authorities, and that they have strong
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connections among powerful people at every level in American public
life." There is evidence that in some areas crime syndicates operate
with knowledge of the authorities but that is not universally true. And
the "active participation of local authorities" is certainly few and far
between as far as I have read in the press. Nor is there any evidence
that organized crime has infiltrated into "every level in American
public life." Such a blunderbuss indictment requires a bill of
particulars. The author names four Congressmen none of whom as of
this date have been charged with a criminal offense, much less
convicted. And the fifth, Bobby Baker, one-time Secretary to the
Democratic Majority in the Senate, was convicted of income tax
evasion. This documentation leaves much to be desired. Not satisfied
with this, the author asserts that since Senators and even Presidents
often start working for their political party in some "seamy" local
political borough, they are suspect. It takes "vastly more money and
more supporting cronies" to reach their high offices, he says, and,
therefore, "the lines of influence [of organized crime] reach upward
. . . . to much higher levels . . . a reserved seat in the Senate wing or
the Oval Room [of the White House]." This, I submit, is below the
belt. However, it follows the pattern of another bootstrap operation
which Mr. King supports as a series of "ifs." The author says that
"if' $20 billion is gambled every year; and "if' the take of the
gambler is one-third i.e. $6-7 billion; and "if" the gamblers who
"level" with their interrogators are truthful in saying that one-third of
the take goes to public officials for protection; ergo it "can be
responsibly asserted that no less than $2 billion per year is sponged up
by officials and law enforcers as the price exacted for letting the
gambling promoter and the gambling syndicates carry on their
enterprises in our society." The author's concept of "responsibly"
differs from mine. I would say that this conclusion is the rankest
conjecture. It poses too many "ifs." While I have been out of politics
for over a score of years, I expect the present pattern runs about the
same. There are local officials who permit gambling within their
jurisdiction; and there are some who require tribute, either in money
or votes. But this is by no means generally true. Indeed, the political
honesty of our officeholders is much higher than ever in our history. I
submit that it is high time that we cease this wholesale reckless
condemnation of public officials as a bunch of crooks. I say that as a
class they are generally honest, dedicated, high-minded and loyal
people; indeed, as good in these respects as most any group in our
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society. And furthermore, to make them the whipping boy does not
help the cause of good law enforcement.
Having spoken my piece in this regard, I hasten to say that
Gambling and Organized Crime is a fascinating and instructive book.
I could not put it down. The chapter on the "Gambler's Arts" gives
even the sophisticated a vivid and detailed description of the gamblers'
tools all the way from a deck of cards to a numbers game. However,
his dollar allocations are mere speculation, except perhaps in pari-
mutuel and state-controlled gambling enterprises. Even here, human
nature being what it is, many people still prefer the anonymity of the
bookies to the obviousness of the race tracks and the illegal numbers
racket to the state-run lottery. For some reason people have an
obnoxiousness to gambling with their state. They always lose.
Also, Mr. King faces up to the realities of local law enforcement.
However, as I have said, I have some qualms over his broad "pay off"
conclusions. The reason gambling laws are not enforced is because the
people do not demand it! After all, public officials are elected every two
years in most communities. If the people want gambling stopped, all
they have to do is to elect officials who will stop it. But this they do
not do although many opportunities arise. Perhaps what we need is an
aroused public-a determination to get "involved" on the side of the
angels in this gambling menace.
This leads me to Mr. King's proposition that gambling activity
itself is not a social evil. I disagree. It is most insidious, threatening
the very foundations of a free society. I doubt if there is a greater threat
to family stability. It often steals the very necessities of life, as is
reflected in case after case in our courts. This is particularly true
among wage earners. It also lowers our moral standards and is an
invitation to take chances with the law. The English licensing system
shows a 400 percent increase in gambling since its 1960 Act became
effective. This is a take estimated at $50 per year from every man,
woman and child in that country. And now it has become so attractive
financially that the British say America's gamblers are gradually
taking it over. In addition, adverse economic, legal, and social effects
.are making some sociologists wonder where it wili all end. Some say
that the mores of the people have been directly affected for the worse.
And the British system is not taxed at all so the government does not
benefit financially.
The ultimate remedy, I believe, lies in the mores of the people. If
every community would elect a government dedicated to stamping out
gambling, it would be quickly cut to a minimum. But I doubt if that
1970]
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is going to be done. Nor can we stamp gambling out by criminal
prosecutions. More and more we are finding that the criminal law does
not have effective enforcement capacity where the crime involves
private morality. These offenses usually lack complainants; this poses
difficult prosecution problems. The public just will not become
involved. Examples are narcotics, prohibition, abortion, sexual
behavior, and gambling. As an old prosecutor I know this to be true.
Way back in the twenties I filed a statutory injunction suit to close up
a hotel because it allowed a gambling room to be operated on its
premises. We had several "players" who were arrested in the police
raid on the hotel, but we soon -found out that we had no witnesses.
Every "player" folded up by disappearing, denying the facts, or
becoming ill at trial time. And in the late forties while Attorney
General I dispatched an assistant, Max Goldschein, to carry on a
federal crusade against crime. Our plan was to coordinate all federal
investigative agencies, base our grand jury authority on tax and
narcotic reports, and get the F.B.I. to give us a list of the members of
the organized syndicates. We got the wholehearted support of the
Narcotics Bureau, but the I.R.S. and the F.B.I. were "too busy."
Max's activity alarmed the hoodlums in New Jersey, Chicago, and
Kansas City, but nothing much was accomplished. It may have
sparked the Conference on Organized Crime which my successor,
Howard McGrath, conducted soon after I went on the Court.
This leads me to conclude that Mr. King's remedies will be
unavailing. Even though local laws are strengthened, there must be a
will to enforce them. Certainly, permitting charities to gamble, even
under circumstances that are private, casual, occasional, and social,
will but increase the public permissiveness of immorality. Likewise,
pari-mutuel betting is not going to improve the mores of the people.
Off-track betting-despite the purity claimed for the racetracks-is
inevitable and can only further corrupt. Corruption begets corruption.
And state participation creates a double standard which plagues us in
so many areas now. If I can gamble by paying an extrance fee at the
racetrack gate and wasting my afternoon, why should I not be able to
stay at work, bet on the same horses and not go to the track? And
when the state itself permits public gambling, like Nevada, New
Hampshire, and New York, on what moral ground is the halo removed
from private betting. I am opposed to the government being a party
to such corruptibles. If the state is not about the gambling spirit, how
can you expect me to be.
What remedies do I propose? None! But I doubt if Mr. King's
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program will work. Especially am I opposed to any change in the
fourth amendment's probable cause requirements. I agree with Mr.
Justice Holmes that the government should not play "an ignoble part"
in any endeavor. It should be the exemplar of its citizens. Likewise my
experience with immunity statutes leads to the conclusion that their
extension will be of little help. Certainly tax statutes will only lead to
more law-breaking and more corruption.
Of course, I have no quarrel with the strengthening and
clarification of gambling laws, both federal and state. I agree that little
hope can be placed in local law enforcement unless the local people
demand it. Perhaps churches, schools, and the news media could help
in this regard. As to bribery, political contributions, etc., perhaps a
federal law making such activity federal offenses could be legally
created. If so, these prosecutions could be initiated by federal officers.
This would be a big help. Mr. King proposes that the use of United
States currency in a gambling transaction be invoked as a basis for
federal jurisdiction. This raises serious problems which might be
avoided by placing jurisdiction on the federal guarantee of a republican
form of government. However, I do not pass on the validity of either
since I still sit in federal courts, other than the Supreme Court.
Knowing the Congress, as I do, and the proclivity of the F.B.I. to shy
away from local problems, I doubt that a national anti-gambling act
will ever be in the United States Code. It would open up a Pandora's
box of law enforcement problems with which even the F.B.I. could
hardly cope. Indeed, the Bureau would have to be transformed into a
national police force in order to meet its obligation under such a
statute. The unpunished delinquencies that we presently suffer have
spawned a family of delinquencies that we cannot seem to solve. Why
create more?
This leads me to the proposals of Morris and Hawkins in their
The Honest Politicians Guide to Crime Control, The University of
Chicago Press, to have been released in February, 1970. Some of their
proposals make good sense. They would abolish the criminal offenses
of (1) public drunkenness; (2) acquisition, purchase, possession in
limited quantities, and use of any drug (sales would not be affected);
(3) gambling, except fraudulent and cheating; (4) disorderly conduct
and vagrancy, unless precisely proscribed; (5) abortion, where
performed by a qualified doctor; (6) consenting adult sexual behavior;
and (7) juvenile delinquency, except conduct by children which would
be criminal were they adult. I agree with all of these proposals, save
(2) and (3). With reference to (2), offenses as to hard drugs should be
1970]
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continued and improved enforcement undertaken. As to (3)
professional gambling activity should be proscribed. Even with these
modifications the Morris and Hawkins proposals would cut the present
incidence of arrests for index crimes half in two. As they point out, this
would reduce the pressure on police, courts, and correctional services
in such massive proportions that they could concentrate on the solution
of the more serious offenses, carry on research, and improve and extend
correctional activities. This would improve the integrity of law
enforcement agencies and make the administration of justice much
more effective. Nor would it have an adverse effect on the mores of
the people. Indeed, public drunkenness might be entirely eliminated
through half-way houses, narcotic traffic reduced through treatment,
abortionists put out of business, prostitution alleviated, and the control
of juvenile delinquency improved.
I hope that Gambling and Organized Crime is a best seller because
of its educational value. It teaches us two things. First, that we really
know very little about crime, its causes or its cures. And, second, unless
we control organized gambling, it is going tO destroy our society. In
focusing upon the problem in such a comprehensive way, Mr. King has
made an unanswerable case against professional gambling. As he says,
it is not the mission of his book to alarm or embarrass, but more to
exhort and persuade. People from all walks of life must "take a
sustained and watchful interest in the gambling situation, and . ...
insist that reasonable efforts be made to remedy it." For presenting
this laudable purpose with such force, Mr. King deserves the top award
of the year. I, too, am hopeful that the public will become involved in
the solution of the problem. With more "Kings" around they will!
TOM C. CLARK*
* Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States (Retired).
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THE THROWAWAY CHILDREN. By Lisa Aversa Richette. New York:
J.B. Lippincott, 1969. Pp. x, 342. $6.95.
It is difficult to decide whether this is a serious or humorous book.
Ultimately, it does not really matter because it fails on both counts.
The inability of the juvenile justice system and related agencies of
social control to deal with the problems of urban and suburban youth
is the central focus of The Throwaway Children. It is written by Lisa
Aversa Richette, a practicing lawyer and philanthropist, and based on
her personal experiences as an Assistant District Attorney in
Philadelphia's juvenile court.
Most of the book's eighteen chapters are devoted to case histories
which provide vignettes of horror and depravity, reminiscent of
nineteenth century. literature on the "dangerous classes." Rather than
select routine cases of theft, fighting, truancy, and curfew, which make
up the majority of juvenile court referrals, the author decided to shock
the reader into indignation by providing detailed descriptions of
murder, rape, incest, and variations on themes of violence and
perversion. Occasionally, we are treated to accounts of suburban
perversion, but for the most part Mrs. Richette "exposes" the
pathology and depravity of lower-class life.
Interspersed between lurid case histories can be found a good deal
of common sense information about the structure and operation of the
juvenile court, the roles performed by various actors in the juvenile
court system, the significance of the Gault decision,' authorizing due
process for juveniles, and recent proposals for controlling delinquency.
As an account of how a middle-class child-saver-trained at Yale
Law School-came to discover the poor and their problems, this is a
fascinating document. This perspective has a long and honorable
tradition in American philanthropy, dating back to the crusading
reformers of the last century. As a serious book about juvenile
delinquency, it is a remarkable failure in a number of ways.
First, the book contains no new information and a minimal
amount of critical analysis. Second, its selection of case-histories is so
biased and cutely succinct that the reader is left with the impression
that the life of the urban poor consists of nothing more than violence
and exotic depravity. Third, the author treats the problem of juvenile
delinquency in the context of psychopathology and does not even
consider the possibility that crime is a result of economic and political
inequality. Finally, the author uncritically accepts the assumption that
delinquency can be eliminated without radical changes in the structure
1. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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and distribution of power. It is remarkable how a book dealing in large
part with crime in the ghetto does not address itself to discussing
poverty, racism, and class relationships. By its deficiences, this is an
elitist and racist book because it contributes to the myths of equality
and freedom.
It is difficult to know for whom the book is written. Law students
interested in juvenile justice would do better to read the recent studies
by Aaron Circourel, Edwin Lemert, and Robert Emerson. Students
interested in crime and deviance might find this a useful example of the
perspective of moral crusaders. I suspect, however, that the book is
designed for the "informed layman," the "concerned citizen," and the
"forgotten American." Written in a straightforward style, with
occasional references to scholarly literature, the book might easily be
serialized for Reader's Digest. In fairness to the author, it should be
observed that there would be no market for condescending books like
The Throwaway Children if academics w*rote more intelligibly and with
greater responsibility to the non-academic public.
It is also possible that this book is a hoax, satirizing a literary
genre which treats "serious" subjects in a "popular" fashion. As a
piece of social satire, it has some deft touches. Slums are described as
"teeming" and "cluttered;" a black gang called the "Algerians"
evoked "visions of gleaming knives and pistols, night raids, tortures,
and mysterious rituals;" as evidence of Margo's sexual delinquency, we
are told that her "vaginal opening admits four fingers;" then there is
Ava-"tall, voluptuous, her scrubbed unmade-up face as exquisite as
a cameo"-who tried to make the judge in his chambers; finally, in a
gem of casework satire, we are informed that "many ghetto parents,
overwhelmed by their own inadequacies and frustrations and hampered
by lack of funds, do not know how to share meaningful experiences
with their children."
The book also includes some broad humor. For example, in a
crude pun, the author suggests that "many juvenile court judges have
been lovers of children." And for ribald humor, it is difficult to beat
her story about how eleven-year-old Leslie and twelve-year-old June
were mounted by three boxer dogs named Ralph, Billy, and John.
During the girls' trial, the judge was informed by the S.P.C.A. that the
dogs were "in a state of sexual frenzy and have tried to mount every
human who came into contact with them. . . . Apparently they are
very intelligent pedigreed dogs."
The book is set in very large type for morons. There is a cute
photograph of Mrs. Richette on the dust-cover. She's smiling.
ANTHONY PLATT*
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